| 虚假会计信息的经济博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张妮,张健光.虚假会计信息的经济博弈分析[J].西北农林科技大学学报,2007,7(2):43-46. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张妮 张健光 |
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| 作者单位： | 武警工程学院经济系,陕西西安,710086 |
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| 摘 要： | 企业中普遍存在会计信息造假。从博弈论的经典例子“囚徒困境”出发，构建了会计舞弊行为模型，从成本收益和治假机制角度分析了会计信息造假的必然，提出要加大违法成本、加强执法力度等措施来约束会计信息造假。
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| 关 键 词： | 囚徒困境 会计信息 博弈 成本收益分析 监督 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-9107(2007)02-0043-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年7月20日 |
Economical Gambling Analysis of False Accounting Information |
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| ZHANG Ni,ZHANG Jian-guang.Economical Gambling Analysis of False Accounting Information[J].Journal of Northwest Sci-Tech University of Agriculture and Forestry(Social Science),2007,7(2):43-46. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Ni ZHANG Jian-guang |
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| Institution: | ZHANG Ni, ZHANG Jian-guang ( Depantment of Economics ,Engineering College of Armed Police Force ,Xi＇an 710086 ,China) |
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| Abstract: | There are widely existing phenomenton of creatiing false accounting information in enterprises.Based on classical case of "prisoner dilemma"in game theory,we set up an accounting fraud behavioral model.From the views of cost benefit and false accounting information governed,we conclude that some enterprises providing false accounting information is inevitable and bring forward increasing illegal costs and intensity law enforcement as countermeasures. |
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| Keywords: | prisoner's dilemma accounting information theory of games cost-benefit analysis supervision |
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