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供应链伙伴信息共享的博弈与激励
引用本文:王瑛.供应链伙伴信息共享的博弈与激励[J].中国管理科学,2005,13(5):61-66.
作者姓名:王瑛
作者单位:清华大学——红塔集团博士后工作站, 北京, 100084
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70028102)
摘    要:针对产销双方对供求信息掌握的不对称性,分析了实现供应链合作伙伴信息共享的条件,从保证供应链合作伙伴信息共享的实现出发,建立了信息共享的博弈模型,分析了共享需求信息和成本信息前后期望利润变化,提出了在制造商与分销商信息共享的激励机制。通过激励机制,改变Nash均衡解的利润分配,在价格优惠和一次性补贴下,使供应链伙伴均获得信息共享带来的收益增加。

关 键 词:供应链  非对称信息  信息共享  博弈论  激励  
文章编号:1003-207(2005)05-0061-06
收稿时间:2004-12-06;
修稿时间:2004年12月6日

Game and Incentives in the Information Sharing among Supply Chain Members
WANG Ying.Game and Incentives in the Information Sharing among Supply Chain Members[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2005,13(5):61-66.
Authors:WANG Ying
Institution:Tsinghua University-Hongta Group Postdoctoral Station, Beijing 100084, China
Abstract:Considering the fact that each of the supply chain members grasps asymmetric information on demanding and supplying,the author analyzes the preconidtions to realize the information sharing among the members.A game model is suggested to share information on demand and cost.The change between the expected profit before sharing and that after sharing is discussed and an incentive mechanism is also proposed to promote the information sharing among the manufactures and the distributors.This incentive mechanism modifies the profit distributed at the point of balanced Nash solution and therefore,with a favorable price and a one-time allowance,the benefits brought by the information sharing of all the supply chain members have been increased.
Keywords:supply chain  asymmetric information  information sharing  gama theory  incentives  
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