中国县级政府税收竞争研究

税收竞争是地方政府财政竞争的常见方式。为吸引税基，放松税收征管力度是其主要表现形式。理论模型表明地方政府不同策略行为取决于相对税率的权衡；政府间不同的资本税率弹性导致了实际税率的分化。利用空间计量方法分析了中国县级政府的税收竞争行为，发现相邻县存在显著的策略互补(税收模仿)；异质性政府税率存在差异，贫穷县的实际税率要高于富裕县。纠正扭曲的税收征管策略和提升市场保护激励是未来改革关键。

A Study of Tax Competition at County-Level in China

Tax competition is one of the common methods of the competition among the local governments. In order to attract the tax base, loosens the efforts on tax collecting is the main form of competition. Theoretical model demonstrates that different strategies behaviors of counties depend on the governments’ relative rates. The difference of tax rate of capital elasticity lead to actual tax rates divergence. We employ spatial econometric method to analyze the tax competition, an empirical analysis of the county-level panel data finds robust results: adjacent counties in the business tax rate have significant strategic complementarity behavior (tax mimicking); heterogeneity of government tax rate has differences, the poor county is higher than the rich county. Correcting tax collection twist and improving incentive of market protection is the key of future reforms.