剩余权最优配置探寻与国有企业改革

由于不确定性的存在,企业合约不可能是完全的,因此,将无法完全的部分称之为剩余,而与剩余有关的一些权力,称之为剩余权。假定剩余权分为剩余索取权与剩余控制权,剩余索取权是针对不确定性产生的利润而言的,而剩余控制权是企业的一些生死攸关的决策,并将这两种权力统称为剩余权。既然剩余权力面临着配置问题,那么在理论上可能存在最优。我们通过对一元产权企业、二元产权结构企业与多元产权结构企业的分析得出企业剩余权的配置可能存在最优解,即当所有要素对应的剩余权力变化至要素的剩余权边际贡献相等时,企业的剩余权配置达到最优,而要素剩余权力边际贡献的改变则要依赖于要素的相对重要性,从而形成了由要素相对重要性为起点的均衡剩余权配置的关系,而由此得出的结论对国有企业改革可能会具有一定的启发性意义。

Optimal Allocation of Residual Rights and the Reformation of State Enterprises

Because of the existence of uncertainty,enterprise contract cannot be complete.The incomplete part is called residue and its relevant rights are named residual rights.Residual rights can be divided into residual claim and residual control.The former is the right based on the profit produced by uncertainty and the latter concerns vital decisions made by the enterprise.In this article,these two rights are both called residual rights.Since the residual rights face the problem of allocation,then in theory,the optimal resolution could exist.Through analysis of the firm made up of sole,two and more property rights,this article concludes that the optimal resolution might be present.That is the allocation of residual rights will be optimal when the marginal contributions of every factor's residual rights which depend on factors' relative importance are equal.Then the article discusses the relation from factors' relative importance to optimal allocation of residual rights.These conclusions might shed light on the reform of state owned enterprise.