| 销售激励与定价关系研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈剑,徐鸿雁.销售激励与定价关系研究[J].清华大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2006(Z1). |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈剑 徐鸿雁 |
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| 作者单位： | 清华大学经济管理学院 北京100084 |
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| 摘 要： | 当前有很多制造商雇佣销售代理销售产品,销售代理与顾客的直接接触获得了更加准确的需求信息,这些信息对制造商的其他运作决策等都有重要的影响。反过来,制造商的运作决策又会影响顾客的需求和销售代理的销售努力。该文研究的就是制造商如何设定激励合同激励销售代理努力工作同时为制造商提供真实的市场信息,制造商利用这些信息进行产品的定价。将采用委托代理理论的方法找到最优的产品销售价格和最优的激励合同,并对它们之间的关系进行分析。
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| 关 键 词： | 激励合同 信息对称 信息不对称 委托代理理论 |
Salesforce Incentives and Pricing |
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| CHEN Jian,XU Hong-yan.Salesforce Incentives and Pricing[J].Journal of Tsinghua University(Philosophy and Social Sciences),2006(Z1). |
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| Authors: | CHEN Jian XU Hong-yan |
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| Abstract: | Nowadays,firms rely on their salespeople to sell their product.Salespeople possess market knowledge that is critical for a wide range of operation decisions.On the other side,the operation decisions also influence the market and the effort made by salespeople.The purpose of this paper is to study how can a firm provide incentives to its salespeople so that they work hard to sell the product and disclose what they know about the market,then the firm uses the information to decide the price.We will use principle-agency theory to find the optimal price and optimal incentive contract for the firm,and analyze the relationship between them. |
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| Keywords: | incentive contracts symmetric information asymmetric information principal agent theory |
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