On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules |
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Authors: | Mostapha Diss Vincent Merlin |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Haifa, 31905, Israel;(2) Department of Economics, Boston University, 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215, USA;(3) Center for Rationality and Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 91904, Israel |
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Abstract: | When choosing a voting rule to make subsequent decisions, the members of a committee may wish this rule to be self-selected
when it is the object of a choice among a menu of different possible voting rules. Such concepts have recently been explored
in Social Choice theory, and a menu of voting rule is said to be stable if it contains at least one self-selective voting
rule at each profile of preferences on voting rules. We consider in this article the menu constituted by the three well-known
scoring rules {Borda, Plurality, and Antiplurality}. Under the Impartial Culture assumption, which proposes an a priori model
to estimate the likelihood of the profiles, we will derive a probability for the stability of this triplet of voting rules. |
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