供应链实施低碳技术的博弈与激励机制研究

利用博弈论与收益共享契约模型，分析二级供应链中销售商和制造商在不同关系和不同地位时实施低碳技术的策略选择，并讨论销售商激励制造商实施低碳技术的条件，以及供应链整体帕累托最优剩余收益的分配。研究表明:在分散决策情形下，销售商在静态博弈均衡时将不会分担制造商低碳技术实施成本，而是通过加大低碳补贴力度激励制造商提高低碳减排水平，在Stackelberg均衡时，销售商将选择对自己有利的实施成本承担比例和价格补贴系数的策略组合，可达到同样的激励效果；在集中决策情形下，销售商和制造商合作实施低碳技术，可实现供应链整体低碳投资收益的帕累托优化，基于Rubinstein讨价还价模型的收益共享契约则有助于激励各方开展协作减排。

The Game and Incentive Mechanism for Implementing Low-carbon Technologies in Supply Chain

Game theory and revenue sharing contracts are used to analyze the strategies for the retailer and the manufacturer to implement low-carbon technologies in two-stage supply chain in different relationships and different status and discuss the incentive conditions for the manufacturer to implement low-carbon technologies as well as the allocation of Pareto optimal residual income in the whole supply chain. The results have shown that，in the case of decentralized decision-making，the retailer in the static game equilibrium will not share implementation costs of low carbon technology with the manufacturer，but will increase low-carbon subsidies to motivate the manufacturer to improve the level of emission reduction，while in Stackelberg equilibrium，the retailer will choose the favorable strategy combination involving the ratios of implementation cost and price subsidies，which can achieve the same incentive effect; in the case of centralized decision-making，the retailer and the manufacturer will collaborate to implement low-carbon technologies，which can enable the supply chain reach Pareto optimization of the overall profit，and the revenue sharing contract based on Rubinstein bargaining model can motivate the parties to collaborate in emission reduction.