Two-sided market situations with existing contracts |
| |
Authors: | Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano Vito Fragnelli |
| |
Institution: | 1. CIO and Departamento de Estadística, Matemáticas e Informática, Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche, Elche, Spain 2. Dipartimento di Scienze e Tecnologie Avanzate, Università del Piemonte Orientale, Alessandria, Italy
|
| |
Abstract: | The main aim of this paper is to study two-sided market situations where there are existing contracts which are exogenously
given. These existing contracts could come from a previous competitive period or from any other circumstances. In any case,
all these existing contracts provide an initial feasible solution for the two-sided market situation, perhaps non optimal
in the sense the agents do not obtain jointly the maximum profit that they could get by cooperation. Therefore, the agents
could be interested in improving their results through cooperation but taking into account the existing bilateral contracts.
Thus, taking as starting point what each agent has got with the existing contracts, they have to distribute among themselves
the extra amount that they could get by cooperation. For this kind of cooperative situation we propose different models and
prove some results about the nonemptiness of the core and its relationship with the Owen set. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|