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Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell
Authors:Rabah Amir  Sergei Belkov  Igor V Evstigneev
Institution:1.Department of Economics,University of Iowa,Iowa City,USA;2.Department of Economics,University of Manchester,Manchester,UK
Abstract:We analyze the concept of correlated equilibrium in the framework of two-player two-strategy games. This simple framework makes it possible to clearly demonstrate the characteristic features of this concept. We develop an intuitive and easily memorizable test for equilibrium conditions and provide a complete classification of symmetric correlated equilibria in symmetric games.
Keywords:
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