| Abstract: | Much of the existing research into the divorce of ownership and control either focuses on the propensity for the separation of decision functions or upon scrutinizing conceptions, gauges or the practicalities of organizational control in large corporations. Although far from equivocal, such research appears broadly to concur that where ownership is dispersed, de facto control is likely to be exerted by management and that where ownership is closely‐held, de facto as well as legal control is exerted by owners. This study examines this assumption through exploring the nature of control in a closely‐held family firm. In this regard, the focus of this study is not on consequences of divorced ownership and control but rather on exploring the contingencies where ownership and control diverge. This research reveals a case wherein a closely‐held family firm is strategically and operationally controlled by its managers. Case research leads to the development of a range of insights regarding the owner/family and the management characteristics that contribute to this scenario. The paper concludes with a series of implications and conclusions. |
