公司治理结构中的代理成本与审计独立性的相关性研究

本文从"提高审计独立性对代理成本的影响"和"代理成本的高低对审计独立性的影响"两个角度,对代理成本与审计独立性的相关性进行了理论分析,认为代理成本与审计独立性具有正相关性,并将这一结论作为研究假设,提出了建立数学模型对两者的相关性进行实证研究的思路。文章认为,要提高审计独立性将会导致公司代理成本的相应提高,反之,代理成本越高,被审单位从其自身利益出发,必然要提高审计独立性。

Study on Relevance Between Agency Cost and Audit Independence in the Governance Structure

This paper from makes a theoretical analysis toward the relevance between agency cost and audit independence from the two points of view--＂ the influence of improving the independence of the audit on the agency cost＂and＂the influence of the high and low of agency cost on audit independence＂,and believes that agency cost and audit independence are positive correlation; and them it takes this conclusion as the research hypothesis,proposes the thought to conduct empirical research on the correlation between them by the establishment of mathematical model. This paper thinks that to improve the independence of the audit will lead to the corresponding increase of agency cost of the companies,and vice versa,the agency cost will be higher; the organization audited is bound to increase the audit independence for its own interests.