The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable |
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Authors: | Murat R. Sertel Bilge Yılmaz |
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Affiliation: | Center for Economic Design, Bo?azi?i University, TR-80815 ?stanbul, Turkey (e-mail: msertel@turk.net), TR Finance Department, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA, US
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Abstract: | It is shown that the Majoritarian Compromise of Sertel (1986) is subgame-perfect implementable on the domain of strict preference profiles, although it fails to be Maskin-monotonic and is hence not implementable in Nash equilibrium. The Majoritarian Compromise is Pareto-optimal and obeys SNIP (strong no imposition power), i.e. never chooses a strict majority's worst candidate. In fact, it is “majoritarian approving” i.e. it always picks “what's good for a majority” (alternatives which some majority regards as among the better “effective” half of the available alternatives). Thus, being Pareto-optimal and majoritarian approving, it is majoritarian-optimal. Finally, the Majoritarian Compromise is measured against various criteria, such as consistency and Condorcet-consistency. Received: 31 January 1995/Accepted: 22 July 1998 |
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