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“三鹿奶粉事件”背景下的我国食品安全监管的博弈分析
引用本文:蔡新,易伟义. “三鹿奶粉事件”背景下的我国食品安全监管的博弈分析[J]. 湖南工程学院学报(社会科学版), 2009, 19(3): 24-28
作者姓名:蔡新  易伟义
作者单位:1. 湖南科技大学商学院,湖南,湘潭,411201
2. 湖南科技大学商学院,湖南,湘潭,411201;湖南工程学院经济管理学院,湖南,湘潭,411104
摘    要:"三鹿奶粉事件"再一次给我国的食品安全问题敲响了警钟.运用博弈论的理论对食品安全的监管过程进行了分析,通过分析均衡结果与非均衡结果的经济含义指出在监管过程中"以罚代法"及"免检制"的不科学性;并从理论上对监管工作的制度设计和政策制定提出建议,主要有:综合各种措施降低监管成本;在监管过程中更加强调监管者的作用,同等地加大对违法厂商与渎职监管者的处罚力度;废除非"免检制"以及建立监管工作的长效机制.

关 键 词:食品安全  监管  "  三鹿奶粉事件"    博弈论

A Game Theory Analysis of the Supervision of Food Safety in the Background of Sanlu Milk Powder Event
CAI Xin,YI Wei-yi. A Game Theory Analysis of the Supervision of Food Safety in the Background of Sanlu Milk Powder Event[J]. Journal of Hunan Institute of Engineering(Social Science Edition), 2009, 19(3): 24-28
Authors:CAI Xin  YI Wei-yi
Affiliation:CAI Xin,YI Wei-yi(1.Buisiness School,Hunan University of Science and Technology,Xiangtan 411201,China,2.School of Economics and Management,Hunan Institute of Engineering,Xiangtan 411104,China)
Abstract:Sanlu milk powder event has alarmed us again to pay attention to the supevision of food safety in our country.In this paper the process of supervising food safety is analyzed by the method of game theory,it is pointed out by analysing the econmic meaning of equilibrium outcome and nonequilibrium outcome that in food safety supervision,fine instead of legal responsibilitiesandsystem of inspection exemption are not scientific.This paper puts forward suggestions for system and policy making in supervision of f...
Keywords:food safety  supervision  Sanlu milk powder event  game theory  
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