Goal-oriented agents in a market |
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Affiliation: | 1. Univ. Autonoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, Barcelona, Spain;2. CEE-M, Univ. Montpellier, CNRS, INRAe, Institut Agro, Montpellier, France |
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Abstract: | We consider a market where “standard” risk-neutral agents coexist with “goal-oriented” agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the “trigger”) to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goal-oriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments. |
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Keywords: | Goal-oriented agents Incentives Matching market |
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