The Ross-Dunlop debate revisited

An alternative interpretation of the Ross-Dunlop debate of the 1940s is provided, which reveals little difference in the opinions of these two theorists on the role of optimizing behavior and of economic factors in explaining trade union behavior. Importantly, both saw theories of union activity based on simple economic maximands as unable to incorporate some “political” features of those unions. The recent wave of economic analyses of trade unions however seems to have answered such criticism to a large extent. A survey of this work is provided to show how many of Ross’s “unanswered questions” can be explained by models where rational trade unions maximize relatively straightforward objective functions. This work is based on chapter 1 of the author’s M.A. thesis at the University of Melbourne. Many thanks are due to Ian McDonald for his generous help, and to Greg Whitwell for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The author is presently a graduate student at Yale University.