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企业创新行为的博弈分析
引用本文:徐可. 企业创新行为的博弈分析[J]. 太原理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2008, 26(2): 10-12,78
作者姓名:徐可
作者单位:商丘师范学院,经济管理系,河南,商丘,476000
摘    要:企业的创新动机很大程度上源自于竞争对手和潜在竞争者的威胁,因此创新行为也是双方或多方的博弈结果。通过对创新行为中的两人零和博弈、多人博弈、理想状态博弈、囚徒困境和动态博弈的求解,可以对创新中的合作、创新利益的分配、技术外溢与专利保护等因素进行分析;并对如何激励企业创新、完善企业创新外部环境提出建议。

关 键 词:创新行为  博弈  创新环境

Game-theory Analysis on the Innovation Behaviors of Enterprises
XU Ke. Game-theory Analysis on the Innovation Behaviors of Enterprises[J]. Journal of Taiyuan University of Technology(Social Sciences Edition), 2008, 26(2): 10-12,78
Authors:XU Ke
Affiliation:XU Ke (Department of Economic Management ,Shangqiu Normal College ,S hangqiu Renan 476000,China)
Abstract:The enterprise motive of innovation arouses from the threat of realistic or latent rivals, so the behavior of the innovation is always the result of the games. We can discuss on the cooperation, benefits distribution, tech-overflow and patent protection in the process of innovation, and propose some suggestions on improvement the policy to encourage it, by the solution of the game-theory models such as zero-summed,poly-parties, prison-dilemma,and its statics or dynamics ananlysis.
Keywords:innovation behavior  game theory  innovationa  environment
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