| 国内地方政府发展新能源产业的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 邱晓明.国内地方政府发展新能源产业的博弈分析[J].扬州大学学报(人文社会科学版),2011,15(4):27-31. |
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| 作者姓名： | 邱晓明 |
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| 作者单位： | 电子科技大学中山学院,广东中山,528402 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金项目(10BGL066); 国家软科学研究计划立项项目(2010GXS5D228) |
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| 摘 要： | 在指标考核体系形成的锦标赛机制下,国内地方政府发展新能源产业的博弈不仅不利于新能源产业整体水平的提升,而且还有可能在新能源产业领域里出现新一轮产能过剩,结果是整个地区收益水平下降和新能源产业长远发展利益受损。在地方政府与新能源投资者之间的博弈中,地方政府处境类似＂囚徒困境＂,对成为竞争失败者的担心会使地方政府使用一切所能使用的优惠政策参与竞标。
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| 关 键 词： | 地方政府 新能源产业 指标考核体系 博弈 |
A Game Theory Analysis of the New-energy Industry Competition Between Local Governments |
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| QIU Xiao-ming.A Game Theory Analysis of the New-energy Industry Competition Between Local Governments[J].Journal of Yangzhou University(Humanities and Social Sciences Edition),2011,15(4):27-31. |
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| Authors: | QIU Xiao-ming |
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| Institution: | QIU Xiao-ming(Zhongshan College,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Zhongshan 528402,Guangdong,China) |
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| Abstract: | Under a tournament-type mechanism of performance indicators appraisal system,the competition between local governments in developing new energy industry may lead to excess capacity in new energy industry instead of promoting the industry,thus reducing the local profits and harming the long-term sector-wide benefits.In the game between new-energy investors and local governments,the latter might be situated in a prisoners' dilemma,which will adopt any preferential policy options in fear of losing the game. |
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| Keywords: | local governments new energy industry performance indicators appraisal system game theory |
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