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供应链中供应商订单分配的不完全信息动态博弈研究
引用本文:张旭梅,李国强,张翼. 供应链中供应商订单分配的不完全信息动态博弈研究[J]. 管理学报, 2006, 3(5): 519-523
作者姓名:张旭梅  李国强  张翼
作者单位:重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆市,400044
摘    要:针对制造商和供应商之间的不完全信息动态博弈问题,根据供应商提供的质量、交货期和价格等数据,建立了供应商选择过程中的不完全信息动态博弈模型和奖惩机制,通过判断供应商提供数据的真伪性,对供应商的订单分配问题进行了研究,并用算例验证了所建立模型和奖惩机制的可行性。

关 键 词:供应链管理  供应商选择  不完全信息动态博弈
文章编号:1672-884X(2006)05-0519-05
修稿时间:2005-12-22

Dynamic Game Study on the Incomplete Information About Order Distribution of Suppliers in Supply Chains
ZHANG Xumei,LI Guoqiang,ZHANG Yi. Dynamic Game Study on the Incomplete Information About Order Distribution of Suppliers in Supply Chains[J]. Chinese JOurnal of Management, 2006, 3(5): 519-523
Authors:ZHANG Xumei  LI Guoqiang  ZHANG Yi
Abstract:The information between suppliers and manufacture is incomplete.On the basis of the quality level,delivery timelevel and price the suppliers offered,the game model and the mechanism of rewards and punishment were established.The data offered by suppliers were judged and the order distribution of suppliers was discussed.The game model and mechanism were validated by an example.
Keywords:supply chain management  supplier selection  incomplete information dynamic game
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