首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

基于进化博弈论的医疗器械行业监管研究
引用本文:赵惠良,江红莉,李守伟,何建敏.基于进化博弈论的医疗器械行业监管研究[J].南京航空航天大学学报(社会科学版),2010,12(2):25-29.
作者姓名:赵惠良  江红莉  李守伟  何建敏
作者单位:东南大学,经济管理学院,江苏,南京,211189
基金项目:江苏省科技攻关计划项目
摘    要:从有限理性角度出发,建立了医疗器械监管机构和医疗器械生产企业的进化博弈模型,研究了博弈双方的复制动态方程及动态进化过程,基于雅可比矩阵的局部稳定分析法分析了模型的稳定状态,得出不存在进化稳定策略的结论,并对模型参数进行分析,提出如何减少厂商群体中“违反规则”比例的政策建议。

关 键 词:医疗器械行业  进化博弈  复制动态  进化稳定策略  监管

Supervision of Medical Equipment Industry Based on Evolutionary Game
ZHAO Hui-liang,JIANG Hong-li,LI Shou-wei,HE Jian-min.Supervision of Medical Equipment Industry Based on Evolutionary Game[J].Journal of Nanjing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics(Social Sciences),2010,12(2):25-29.
Authors:ZHAO Hui-liang  JIANG Hong-li  LI Shou-wei  HE Jian-min
Institution:(School of Economics & Management, Southeast University, Nanjing, Jiangsu 21118 9, China)
Abstract:Under the assumption of bounded rational, this paper establishes the Evolutionary Game model between the administration of medical equipment supervision and enterprises of medical equipment, studies the replicator dynamics equations and the procedure of dynamics evolutionary, analyzes the stable station o{ the model based on the local stability analysis of Jacobian Matrix, and reaches the conclusion that there is no evolutionary stable strategy. Besides that, this paper gives out the corresponding policy about how to reduce the rate of "breaking rules" among enterprises colony by analyzing the model parameters.
Keywords:medical equipment industry  evolutionary game  replicator dynamics  evolutionary stable strategy  supervision
本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号