Multiple votes,ballot truncation and the two-party system: an experiment |
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Authors: | Arnaud Dellis Sean D’Evelyn Katerina Sherstyuk |
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Institution: | 1.Département d’Economique,Université Laval and CIRPéE,Quebec,Canada;2.Department of Economics,University of Hawaii at Manoa,Honolulu,USA |
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Abstract: | Duverger’s law states that Plurality Voting tends to favor a two-party system. We conducted laboratory experiments to study
whether voting procedures other than Plurality Voting could favor a two-party system as well. Plurality Voting is compared
with Approval Voting and Dual Voting, both of which allow to vote for multiple candidates, but differ in whether voters are
required to cast all their votes. We find that in most elections held under Plurality Voting and Approval Voting, at most
two candidates are viable. By contrast, three candidates are viable in a sizable number of elections held under Dual Voting
due to strategic voting. Our evidence suggests that Approval Voting may encourage a two-party system, whereas Dual Voting
may encourage multipartism. The voters’ ability to truncate ballots (i.e., not cast all their votes) is essential for supporting
the two-party system under Approval Voting. |
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