Contracts, livestock, and the Bernoulli process: an application of statistics to B. Traven's 'Cattle Drive' |
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Authors: | Emil B Berendt |
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Institution: |
a Division of Business Management, Siena Heights University, Adrian, MI, USA |
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Abstract: | One of the pivotal devices B. Traven employs in his short story 'The Cattle Drive' is a contract between the cattle owner and the trail boss who brings the livestock to market. By specifying a per-diem rate, the contract appears to encourage a wage-maximizing trail boss to delay the delivery of the cattle. However, a statistical model of the contract demonstrates that a rational trail boss has an incentive to maintain a rapid rate of travel. The article concludes that statistics can be applied in non-traditional ways such as to the analysis of the plot of a fictional story. The statistical model suggests plausible alternative endings to the story based on various parameter assumptions. Finally, it demonstrates that a well-crafted story can provide an excellent case study of how contracts create incentives and influence decision-making. |
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Keywords: | B Traven contract principal-agent problem binomial Cattle Drive wage literature |
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