| 中国的横向政府竞争:问题与对策 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘剑雄.中国的横向政府竞争:问题与对策[J].中国社会科学院研究生院学报,2007(6). |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘剑雄 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国社会科学院研究生院政府政策与公共管理系 博士、中国社会科学院经济研究所博士后流动站博士后 |
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| 摘 要： | 在官员选拔制下,中国的横向政府竞争体现出典型"囚徒困境"的特征,其表现就在于严重的地方保护主义和重复建设问题。如果中央政府能够充分发挥地方政府横向竞争的"调控者"作用,中国的横向政府竞争将能达致一个较优的结果。
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| 关 键 词： | 横向政府竞争 地方保护主义 重复建设 |
The Interjurisdictional Competition in China:Issues and Countermeasures |
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| Liu Jianxiong.The Interjurisdictional Competition in China:Issues and Countermeasures[J].Journal of Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,2007(6). |
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| Authors: | Liu Jianxiong |
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| Institution: | Liu Jianxiong |
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| Abstract: | Under the official selection and promotion system,the interjurisdictional competition in China is a kind of Prisoner's Dilemma game,whose results are the serious local protectionism and repeated construction around the whole country.If the central government can play the role of monitor in the interjurisdictional competition,a better competition result could be reached in the interjurisdictional competition in China. |
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| Keywords: | interjurisdictional competition in China local protectionism repeated construction |
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