首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

税务稽查的博弈分析及启示
引用本文:王逸,周铁军.税务稽查的博弈分析及启示[J].中南林业科技大学学报(社会科学版),2007,1(2):119-121.
作者姓名:王逸  周铁军
作者单位:1. 扬州大学法学院,江苏扬州225009
2. 西南财经大学,四川成都610074
摘    要:运用博弈论分析税务机关与纳税人在税务稽查中的行为选择,可据此提出加强税务稽查,防止税收流失的建议:合理确定税务稽查概率和对象,增加稽查的威慑力;运用科学先进的税务稽查技术,提高稽查的准确率;严格惩处执法,提高偷税的预期风险和机会成本;教育与信誉评价相结合,提高偷税的心理成本;完善监控和信息获取机制,降低征收成本;构建税务机关内部质量考核指标体系,形成激励约束机制。

关 键 词:博弈分析  偷税  税务稽查
文章编号:1673-9272(2007)02-0119-03
修稿时间:2006年4月30日

Game Theory Analyses on Taxation Inspection and Its Implication
WANG Yi,ZHOU Tie-jun.Game Theory Analyses on Taxation Inspection and Its Implication[J].Journal of Central South University of Forestry & Technology(Social Sciences),2007,1(2):119-121.
Authors:WANG Yi  ZHOU Tie-jun
Abstract:Using game theory,the paper analyses the action choice of tax authority and taxpayers in the process of taxation inspection.Sggestions for strengthening taxation inspection and preventing tax losing include:confirming probability and object of taxation inspection rationally to increase its frightener;introducing scientific and advanced technology to enhance the accuracy of inspection;strictly enforcing punishment to increase the anticipated risk and opportunity cost of tax evasion;combining education and credit standing evaluation to raise the psychological cost;improving monitor and information system to reduce collection cost;constituting inner quality assess system to form incentive and constraint mechanism.
Keywords:game theory analysis  tax evasion  taxation inspection
本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号