No Switchbacks: Rethinking Aspiration-Based Dynamics in the Ultimatum Game |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Jeffrey?CarpenterEmail author Peter?Hans?Matthews |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Middlebury College, Munroe Hall, Middlebury, VT, 05753, U.S.A |
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Abstract: | Aspiration-based evolutionary dynamics have recently been used to model the evolution of fair play in the ultimatum game showing
that incredible threats to reject low offers persist in equilibrium. We focus on two extensions of this analysis: we experimentally
test whether assumptions about agent motivations (aspiration levels) and the structure of the game (binary strategy space)
reflect actual play, and we examine the problematic assumption embedded in the standard replicator dynamic that unhappy agents
who switch strategies may return to a rejected strategy without exploring other options. We find that the resulting “no switchback”
dynamic predicts the evolution of play better than the standard dynamic and that aspirations are a significant motivator for
our participants. In the process, we also construct and analyze a variant of the ultimatum game in which players can adopt
conditional (on their induced aspirations) strategies. |
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Keywords: | ultimatum game learning aspirations replicator dynamics experiment |
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