| Abstract: | In the high‐tech industry, firms can be partners in one respect (e.g., resellers) and competitors in another. In this article, we investigate the channel structure problem for two firms‐each selling competing products in two complementary markets—who are deciding whether to sell their products to customers directly or distribute one of them through a competitor. The customers are heterogeneous and both firms have products that are horizontally differentiated. When selling products directly, the firm can coordinate the prices of the two complementary products and avoid the inefficiency of double marginalization. However, selling (indirectly) through the competing manufacturer can mitigate competition because the competitor shares the profit of both competing products and therefore does not price its own products aggressively. One might expect that when the externality across the markets is strong, firms would prefer to sell both products directly (rather than through the competitor) in order to take advantage of the complementarity between markets and eliminate the inefficiency of double marginalization. Interestingly, we find that even though the first mover chooses to sell both products directly, the second mover forsakes the opportunity to coordinate the prices of its products and instead opts to distribute one of the products through the first mover. |
