Die Umzugsentscheidung von Paaren als Verhandlungsproblem

Recently bargaining models became a popular theoretical concept within family research. Especially compared to household economic theory, bargaining models are less abstract and provide a tool for analysis of conflicting interests and their consequences in family relationships. However, although there are many different topics which can be tackled with this kind of theory, there is still a lack of direct empirical tests concerning this concept. The aim of this article is to provide such a test by using a special type of a quasi-experimental research design. With a so-called factorial design we vary systematically incentives for a household move in order to model different structural conditions of a relationship like earning possibilities or chances for a career of a partner. This allows us to observe varying power allocations within the relationship. The empirical results support the hypotheses derived from the bargaining model: the respondent anticipates a loss of his or her bargaining power as well as an increasing power of the partner. Consequently they answer such a change with a reduced tendency for a household move and a higher perceived potential for conflicts within the relationship. However, due to our limited knowledge about the validity of the quasi-experimental design these results need to be validated by future research.