非封闭式收费公路逃费的博弈分析

为揭示非封闭式收费公路逃费的本质原因，规避逃费行为，运用博弈理论和期望矩阵模型对逃费现象进行分析。分析认为：在现有约束条件下，逃费者和参与逃费的村民、管理者在相互博弈中共谋逃费是其利益的最优选择。分析结果表明，治理逃费的根本途径在于降低公路收费标准，深化监管体制改革，科学布局公路收费站点。

Game analysis for dodging toll on unclosed toll road

Dodging toll on unclosed road is very difficult to control. It has seriously damaged the in- terests of investors and the development of China＇ s road transport. To reveal the reasons for dodging and avoid it, this paper analyzes the phenomena of dodging the toll through game theory and game expectation matrix. The authors believe that in the current restrictions, dodging toll is the optimal selection in mutual game among the users, the villagers and managers. Therefore, the authors believe that reducing the toll standard, reforming the supervising and management system and setting up toll booth reasonably are the basic ways to solve this problem.