冗余资源配置条件下的企业技术创新激励合约研究

基于多任务委托代理模型的分析框架，建立了企业同时采用新增资源投入和搜寻企业冗余资源进行技术创新的信息不对称条件下的委托代理模型。通过对模型的分析，得出了企业技术创新所需的新增资源和冗余资源投入的优化配置条件，以及2种资源组合配置模式下的企业员工技术创新活动的最优激励合同条件。企业可以根据新增资源的边际收益、边际成本，以及各行动之间成本函数的相互依存性的不同组合，采取适度激励、重度强化激励、轻度强化激励、重度弱化激励和轻度弱化激励等优化激励组合方案来激励员工进行技术创新活动，从而使企业技术创新资源的配置有更多优化方案选择，以降低企业创新的风险和成本，提高资源效率和创新绩效。

Study on Incentive Contracts for Firms' Technological Innovation under Conditions of Slack Resource Allocation

Based on the analysis frames of the multi-task principal-agent model, this paper formulates a model of principal-agent with asymmetrical information while firms use newly-added resources invested and slack resources for technological innovation. Through analysis of the model, this paper obtains the optimal allocation of the newly-added resources invested and slack resources for technological innovation and the optimal incentive contracts of the technological innovation under configuration of these two resources. Firms can take optimal incentive packages such as appropriate incentive, heavy strong incentive, lightly strong incentive, heavy weakened incentive, and lightly weakening incentives according to the marginal returns and marginal cost of new resources and the interdependence of cost function between the actions. The research helps firms have more choices of resource allocation programs for technological innovation, which reduces risk and cost and improves resource efficiency and innovation performance of firms.