| 委托代理制下代理成本与国企激励机制问题研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 曲亚琳,娄本宁.委托代理制下代理成本与国企激励机制问题研究[J].湖南工程学院学报(社会科学版),2006,16(3):38-41. |
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| 作者姓名： | 曲亚琳 娄本宁 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 河南大学,工商管理学院,河南,开封,475004
2. 河南省建筑工程学校,河南,郑州,450007 |
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| 摘 要： | 委托—代理关系普遍存在于实行现代企业制度的企业中。在股东与企业家的委托—代理关系中,存在着效用不一致,并由此引起代理成本问题。建立有效的激励约束机制,才能使企业家的利益和企业有关各方的利益紧密相联,荣辱与共,才能使国有企业的种种“顽症”得以解决。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托—代理 代理成本 国企企业家 激励约束机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-1181(2006)03-0038-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年3月21日 |
Research into Cost under Commission-agency and Incentive Mechanism of State-owned Enterprise |
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| QU Ya-lin,LOU Ben-ning.Research into Cost under Commission-agency and Incentive Mechanism of State-owned Enterprise[J].Journal of Hunan Institute of Engineering(Social Science Edition),2006,16(3):38-41. |
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| Authors: | QU Ya-lin LOU Ben-ning |
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| Abstract: | Commission-agency relations are prevalent in the modern enterprise system.The inconsistent effectiveness exists in the commission-agency relations between shareholders and entrepreneurs,which also results in the cost of Acting.Establishing effective incentive and restraining mechanism can make the entrepreneurs and all enterprises/ parties correlate their interests closely and share honor to make the various"chronic diseases" of state-owned enterprises. |
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| Keywords: | commission-agency acting costs SOE incentive and constaint mechanism |
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