Tarifpolitik zwischen Effektivität und Legitimität

Free collective bargaining, i. e. the right of the two sides of industry to autonomously regulate the terms of employment without any state interference, is one of the core elements of many industrial democracies. The continuous existence of this institution, which, in Austria, avoids or reduces industrial action to an absolute minimum, can be explained by a mutual interest of both, labour and capital representatives, in macroeconomic and political stability. Trade unions usually achieve the internal legitimacy of their rank-and-file and effectiveness of the bargaining system as a whole through substantive improvements of the living and working conditions of their members. Against the background of an economic recession and decreasing membership, trade unions are forced to provide other sources of legitimacy to prevent sanctions by their members. The key question of this paper therefore focuses on how unions are able to equally maintain effectiveness and legitimacy of the collective bargaining institution. In the paper, this question will be dealt with by the example of collective bargaining in an exposed branch of the Austrian industry.