| Abstract: | Recent philosophical work attempts to describe social phenomena in general categories, an approach also interesting for sociologists. The questions as of what constitutes social objects or facts and whether there is a common structure of social phenomena are mostly neglected in sociology. This neglect is problematic because basic questions about conceptualisation and explanation in sociology cannot be pursued without a clear understanding of social phenomena. The philosophical discussions take place vis-à-vis the doctrine of ontological individualism which means that social phenomena are shadow phenomena without reality. Only the actions of individuals and the mental processes being constitutive elements of the actions are real. In opposition to this dogma, Gilbert, Searle and Ruben argue that social phenomena cannot be reduced to actions. Quite the contrary, actions can only be understood if the existence of the phenomena is presupposed. From a sociological point of view there are three remarkable aspects: First, all three authors offer good arguments against ontological individualism. Second, their arguments are based on the reconstruction of the use of everyday concepts referring to social phenomena and are therefore comprehensible. Third, the understanding of social phenomena merely as collective subjects, intentions or systems of interlocking beliefs is too restrictive. Despite this failure these theories show a way to gain a more realistic understanding of social phenomena. |
