Handlungserklärung und die zwei Rationalitäten?

The question is being scrutinized how to integrate into a general theory of action the two types of rational action distinguished by Max Weber based on value rationality and instrumental rationality. Three proposals recently made by Raymond Boudon, Siegwart Lindenberg and Hartmut Esser are considered. These authors agree in conceiving rationality as based on reasons. But, unlike Boudon, Lindenberg and Esser hold that rationality should be essentially considered as consequential and that it is possible to reconstruct value-rational action in this framework, although Weber’s formulation of this type of action clearly excludes a reference to consequences. According to Lindenberg and Esser, this reconstruction of value-rational action can be accomplished by the theory of subjective expected utility supplemented by a concept of framing. In their opinion this kind of model also offers the opportunity to construct a conception superior to a mere typology of action orientations, because it enables us to specify under what conditions which type of action prevails. The article provides evidence that the proposals made by both authors still fall short of offering an adequate model for understanding the difference between both types of action. Lindenberg’s proposal does not sufficiently allow for explaining the difference between traditional and value-rational action and the claim for justification associated with value-rational action. Esser’s conception meets these two criteria but it remains unsettled whether his model already specifies sufficient conditions for value-rational action. The article concludes in considering the general question whether it is conceivable to derive both types of action from a common notion of rationality.