首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: The fixed agenda framework
Authors:Josep E. Peris  M. Carmen Sánchez
Affiliation:(1) Departament de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica, Universitat d'Alacant, 03080 Alacant, Spain (e-mail: peris@merlin.fae.ua.es), ES;(2) Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Universidad de Murcia, Campus de Espinardo, 30100 Espinardo, Murcia, Spain (e-mail: csanchez@fcu.um.es), ES
Abstract:In this paper we analyze the explicit representation of fixed agenda social choice correspondences under different rationality assumptions (independence, Pareto optimality, etc.). It is well known that, under some of these assumptions, the existence of dictators, oligarchies or individuals with veto power can be proven ([6] and [10]); but only a partial characterization of the social choice set is obtained. We establish a relationship between the social choice set and the individuals' maximal sets, which explicitly describes a fixed agenda social choice correspondence that satisfies these rationality assumptions. Received: 30 December 1997/Accepted: 20 December 1999
Keywords:
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号