Two simple characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution |
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Authors: | Osamu Mori |
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Institution: | 1.Jobu University,Isesaki,Japan |
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Abstract: | We provide two alternative characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution. We introduce new simple axioms, strong undominatedness by the disagreement point, and egalitarian Pareto optimality. First, we prove that the Nash solution is characterized by symmetry, scale invariance, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and strong undominatedness by the disagreement point. Second, we replace the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom with the sandwich axiom (Rachmilevitch in Theory Decis 80:427–442, 2016) and egalitarian Pareto optimality. We then demonstrate that the Nash solution is characterized by symmetry, scale invariance, strong undominatedness by the disagreement point, the sandwich axiom, and egalitarian Pareto optimality. |
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