退耕还林还草工程实施中经济利益补偿的博弈分析

作者利用博弈论对退耕还林还草工程牵涉的中央政府、地方政府和农户各方的利益关系进行分析。农户与政府的博弈结果表明,农户与作为整体的政府进行博弈有多个纳什均衡点,要充分调动农户的积极性,政府应选择较高的补偿方式。中央政府与地方政府的博弈结果表明,纳什均衡(不努力,不努力)是各地方政府博弈的结果,而这一策略同时也是占优战略均衡,但无法达到帕累托最优(努力,努力),也就是既节约中央的财政资金,又充分发挥各地区的潜力;要实现帕累托最优,中央必须建立有效的激励监督机制,既要激励合理,又要经常监督,把地方的努力程度作为确定转移支付量的一个重要依据。

A Game Analysis on the Compensation for Interest in the Process of Converting Farmlands Back to Forests and Grasslands

The author utilizes the game theory to analyze the interest of central government, local government and peasant household in the project of converting farmlands back to forests and grasslands. After analyzing the game between government and peasant household, the author analyses the game between central government and local government as well as the game between local governments. It is indicated that Nash Equilibrium (indolence, indolence) is the result of game of local governments. However, while it is dominant strategy equilibrium at the same time, it can not reach the Pareto optimum (diligence, diligence) which can not only economizes the central financial fund but also bring into full play the potentiality of every regions. In order to reach Pareto optimum, the central government must set up an effective mechanism of rational incentive and frequent supervision, taking the degree of local government's diligence as an important factor in deciding the transfer payment and tying to reduce the artificial factors in the process.