Using tri-reference point theory to evaluate risk attitude and the effects of financial incentives in a gamified crowdsourcing task

Crowdsourcing has rapidly developed as a mechanism to accomplish tasks that are easy for humans to accomplish but are challenging for machines. However, unlike machines, humans need to be cajoled to perform tasks, usually through some type of incentive. Since participants from the crowd are typically anonymous and have no expectation of an ongoing work relationship with a task requester, the types of incentives offered to workers are usually short-term monetary bonuses, which have had an inconclusive impact on crowdsourcing worker quality. In this paper, we explore the notion that the risk attitude of crowdsourcing workers may play an important role in the effectiveness of incentives on task accuracy. Traditional utility theories, such as prospect theory, depend on decisions made relative to a singular reference point, whereas the tri-reference point (TRP) theory (Wang and Johnson, J Exp Psychol Gen 141:743–756, 2012) holds that three reference points impact decision making. Using the TRP theory as a guide, we develop a game that provides workers with three reference points and subsequently explores the role of multiple reference points on worker risk aversion and task accuracy.