Ellsberg games |
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Authors: | Frank Riedel Linda Sass |
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Institution: | 1. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, 33501, Bielefeld, Germany
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Abstract: | In the standard formulation of game theory, agents use mixed strategies in the form of objective and probabilistically precise devices to conceal their actions. We introduce the larger set of probabilistically imprecise devices and study the consequences for the basic results on normal form games. While Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the extended game, there arise new Ellsberg equilibria with distinct outcomes, as we illustrate by negotiation games with three players. We characterize Ellsberg equilibria in two-person conflict and coordination games. These equilibria turn out to be related to experimental deviations from Nash equilibrium play. |
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