创新能力不对称企业研发投资策略时机研究

本文运用不对称双寡头期权博弈模型,研究了创新能力差异和先动优势对企业研发投资策略时机的影响,分析了抢先均衡、序贯均衡和同时投资均衡出现的条件.研究表明,当抢先投资的先动优势足够大时,创新能力强的企业抢先创新能力弱的企业投资;当创新能力差异足够大时,两个企业序贯地投资;当创新能力差异较小且不存在明显的先动优势时,两个企业同时投资.在其它条件不变的情况下,创新能力越强,同时投资均衡和序贯均衡出现的可能性越小,抢先均衡出现的可能性越大.

A Study of Strategic R&D Investment Timing of Firms with Asymmetric Innovation Capability

In an asymmetric duopoly option game-theoretic framework,this paper investigates the impacts of innovation capability asymmetry and the first-move advantage on firms′ strategic R&;D investment timing and derives the conditions for the preemptive,sequential and simultaneous equilibrium.We show that when the first-move advantage is significant,the high-capability firm preempts the lower-capability firm.In the situation where the asymmetry between firms becomes sufficiently large,the firms invest sequentially.When the asymmetry among firms is relatively small and so is the first-move advantage,the firms invest simultaneously.We also show that,with the innovation capability increasing,the possibility of simultaneous equilibrium and sequential equilibrium decreases,but that of preemptive equilibrium increases.