| 上游企业R&D投资策略的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 田盈,蒲勇健.上游企业R&D投资策略的博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2004,12(4):28-32. |
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| 作者姓名： | 田盈 蒲勇健 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆, 400044;2. 重庆师范大学数学与计算机学院, 重庆, 400047 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部高校博士点专项基金(20020611009) |
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| 摘 要： | 市场上存在一个上游和一个下游企业时,纵向一体化能使上游企业的R&D投资、下游企业的产品产量和行业利润均增加。本文研究了在不进行纵向一体化的情况下,上下游企业之间是否能够通过谈判,达成契约,从而使上游企业的R&D投资、下游企业的产品产量和行业利润都达到纵向一体化时水平的问题。研究表明:如果上、下游企业进行两阶段动态博弈,该契约不会是一个子博弈精炼纳什均衡。只有上、下游企业进行无限次重复博弈,双方才有可能达成契约,并且双方都会遵守该契约。
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| 关 键 词： | R&D 纵向一体化 契约 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-207(2004)04-0028-05 |
| 收稿时间： | 2003-05-27; |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年5月27日 |
Game Analyseis on R＆D Policy of Upstream Firm |
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| TIAN Ying,PU Yong-jian.Game Analyseis on R＆D Policy of Upstream Firm[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2004,12(4):28-32. |
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| Authors: | TIAN Ying PU Yong-jian |
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| Institution: | 1. College of Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;2. Dept. of Mathematics and Computer Science, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing 400047, China |
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| Abstract: | When an upstream and a downstream firm exist in the market,vertical integration can increase the upstream R&D expenditure,the downstream output,and the industry profit.This paper studies the problem whether the upstream and downstream firms can sign a contract to increase the upstream R&D expenditure,the downstream output,and the industry profit to the level after the vertical integration.It is shown that,if the upstream and downstream firms play two-stage dynamic game,the contract is not a perfect Nash equilibrium.If the upstream and downstream firms play infinitely repeated game,the contract can be signed and abided. |
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| Keywords: | R&D vertical integration contract game |
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