群体竞争、立法博弈与行政垄断豁免

我国《反垄断法》的立法过程中有关行政垄断豁免的反复变化,集中体现了多个利益群体间的竞争与博弈,最终的立法结果也是各方共同作用的结果。设定一个三方群体竞争模型展开行政垄断豁免相关利益群体的立法博弈过程研究,对与行政垄断豁免相关的国有企业、民营企业和消费者三个利益群体在立法过程中的竞争行为和稳定均衡进行分析。结果表明,国企群体集体行为的优势决定了其在群体竞争中的胜出。三方群体竞争可以实现稳定均衡,但由于再分配无谓损失的存在,这一均衡仍有帕累托改进的余地。

Group Competition, Legislative Campaign, and the Exemption of Administrative Monopoly

The constant change concerning administrative monopoly in the legislative process of the Antitrust Law in China reflects the competition and campaign among all the interest groups.The final version of the law is the result of the games among all the groups.This paper analyzes the competitive behavior and the stable equilibrium among the state-owned enterprises,the private enterprises,and the consumer by a model of group competition to explain the exemption of administrative monopoly.The results show that the advantage in collective action of State-Owned Enterprise leads to its gain in the group competition.The final equilibrium in group competition is stable but not Pareto optimal due to the deadweight loss of reallocation.