| 加盟WTO与维护国家经济利益立法 |
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| 引用本文： | 孟咸美.加盟WTO与维护国家经济利益立法[J].扬州大学学报(人文社会科学版),2002,6(5):62-67. |
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| 作者姓名： | 孟咸美 |
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| 作者单位： | 扬州大学,政法学院,江苏,扬州,225009 |
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| 摘 要： | 从GATT(关税与贸易总协定 ) WTO框架体制内发达国家与发展中国家不同的立法对策方面进行分析 ,WTO多边合作实质上是“非合作博弈”。根据博弈理论 ,我国加入WTO后应有维护国家经济利益相应的立法对策
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| 关 键 词： | GATTWTO 发达国家 发展中国家 博弈 立法对策 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-7030(2002)05-0062-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002年4月5日 |
Entry into WTO and Legislation to Safeguard National Economic Benefits |
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| MENG Xian,mei.Entry into WTO and Legislation to Safeguard National Economic Benefits[J].Journal of Yangzhou University(Humanities and Social Sciences Edition),2002,6(5):62-67. |
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| Authors: | MENG Xian mei |
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| Abstract: | On the basis of a review of the different legislative strategies of developed and developing countries, as far as GATT/WTO is concerned, this paper believes that the so called multilateral cooperation between WTO member countries is in fact a non cooperative game of chess. And according to chess game theories, this paper suggests some legislative strategies for China to defend its national economic interests. |
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| Keywords: | GATT/WTO developed countries developing countries chess game theory legislative strategies |
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