基于预期网络规模的双寡头质量竞争

考虑一种具有网络效应特征的产品,本文研究当产品预期网络规模主要受质量影响时,双寡头企业如何进行质量竞争。本文建立了一个两阶段博弈模型的方法分析了这种问题。结果表明,市场领导者获得大于其预期网络规模的市场份额,而市场跟随者获得小于其预期网络规模的市场份额。对于弱网络效应产品,随着网络效应的增强, 两企业的产品质量分化加剧,价格及利润差异随之扩大。当网络效应的强度足够低时,市场跟随者利用后发优势得到较大利润。而对于强网络效应产品,市场领导者利用先发优势得到更大利润。

Duopoly Competition of Quality Based on Expected Network Size

Concerning a product with network effects, the paper studies how duopoly firms compete on quality when the expected network size is affected mainly by the quality level. A two-stage game model is adopted to analyze this problem. It shows that market leader gains greater market share than expected network size, and market followers gets smaller market share than expected network size. For product with weak network effects, when network effects increase, product quality differentiation intensifies. And there are similar situation with also price and profit differentiation. When network effects strength is low enough, market followers gets greater profit for late-mover advantage. For product with strong network effects, market leader will get first-mover advantages getting more profit.