约翰逊政府在越南战争中的核选择:决策与禁忌(1964-1968)--基于对有关解密文档的解读

20世纪60年代是美国在越南战争中军事上逐步升级的过程,也是其核选择(指使用战术核武器)被美国军政高级官员日益严肃考虑并几度欲付诸实战的过程.依据有关解密文件及当事人回忆录,考察了越战时期约翰逊政府进行核决策的过程,认为致使约翰逊政府最终放弃核选择而宁愿承受很高人员伤亡的因素,除了冷战背景下美国对中国、苏联可能的核报复的忌惮,还有美国军政双方在使用核武器的决策过程中一直存有严重分歧;核禁忌观自朝鲜战争以来对美国政府的军事政策产生日益持久的政治和伦理制约;美国考虑到单方面有限使用核武器不仅缺乏足够的军事功效,其所带来的政治上和伦理上的灾难性后果可能远远大于越南战争失败所付出的军事政治代价.

Nuclear option by Johnson's administration during the Vietnam War

The 1960s witnessed the U.S. military escalation in the Vietnam War and the nuclear option-referred to tactical nuclear weapons, which was attracting more consideration from the high - ranking military and political leaders of Johnson's Administration. Based on recently declassified documents and memoirs, this article examined the detailed decision - making process concerning the nuclear option by Johnson's administration during the Vietnam War. It was argued that, besides the fear of a potential China or/and USSR nuclear retaliation, Johnson's administration finally abandoned the nuclear option due to the following reasons: firstly, the disagreements among the top officials in the U. S. government; secondly, effects of nuclear prohibitation view on the U.S. military policies since the Korean War; thirdly, the U.S. government's concern about the more negative results of its own limited use of nuclear weapons.