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Avoiding the voter's paradox democratically
Authors:Davis  Michael
Institution:(1) Department of Philosophy, Case Western Reserve University, USA
Abstract:This paper is concerned with selecting an appropriate perspective from which to understand and evaluate social-decision procedures. Distinguishing between ldquoagentrationalityrdquo and ldquooption-rationalityrdquo, the author argues that a rational agent may choose a social-decision procedure that is not itself agent-rational (but merely option-rational). The argument puts the voter's paradox in a context allowing evaluation of (a) its general import and (b) practical proposals for avoiding it in particular cases. Arrow's four conditions for a social-decision procedure are shown to have little relevance to the understanding or evaluation of constitutions. The author concludes that the more fruitful perspective for discussing social-decision procedures is that of option-rationality rather than (as Arrow, Wolff, and others have supposed) that of agent-rationality.
Keywords:
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