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工资决定的行为与制度分析
引用本文:周业安,宋紫峰.工资决定的行为与制度分析[J].学术月刊,2006(12).
作者姓名:周业安  宋紫峰
作者单位:中国人民大学经济学院 北京100872
摘    要:新古典工资理论很难解释现实的工资差异等问题,新制度经济学把劳动合同的不完全性和劳动市场竞争的不完全性引入,从劳动市场不完全性角度来解释了这些问题。后来的行为和实验经济学研究则给出了不同的证据和结论。这些研究发现,劳动市场参与人是满足行为偏好的,具有公平和互惠动机,公平规范等非正式制度在实际的工资决定中起着重要作用。基于新制度经济学的制度设计,必须和基于行为与实验经济学的规范形成互补,才能真正发挥劳动市场的资源配置作用。

关 键 词:劳动市场不完全  行为和制度分析  公平  工资差异

Behavioral and Institutional Analysis(BIA) of Wage Decision
Abstract:It is difficult for the neoclassical wage theory to explain some wage problems such as wage differential. By introducing the incomplete wage contract and the incomplete labor market competition , NIE gives some answers based on labor market incompleteness. But behavioral and experimental economics have shown some new explains. According to these theories, the agents have behavioral preference, that is, they have fair and reciprocal motives, informal institutions as fair norms are important in wage decision. The complement relations must be constructed between institution design on NIE and norms on BIA, the resource allocation effect of labor market may be truly brought into play.
Keywords:labor market incompleteness  behavioral and experimental analysis(BIA)  fair  wage differential  
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