Rational beliefs in extensive games |
| |
Authors: | Giacomo Bonanno |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of California, 95616 Davis, CA, USA |
| |
Abstract: | Given an extensive game, with every node x and every player i a subset k
i
(x) of the set of terminal nodes is associated, and is given the interpretation of player i's knowledge (or information) at node x. A belief of player i is a function that associates with every node x an element of the set K
i
(x). A belief system is an n-tuple of beliefs, one for each player. A belief system is rational if it satisfies some natural consistency properties. The main result of the paper is that the notion of rational belief system gives rise to a refinement of the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium. |
| |
Keywords: | Information beliefs subgame-perfect equilibrium |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|