When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model |
| |
| Authors: | Richard A Chisik Robert J Lemke |
| |
| Institution: | (1) Department of Economics DM-309C, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199, USA;(2) Department of Economics and Business, Lake Forest College, Box M3, 555 N. Sheridan Road, Lake Forest, IL 60045, USA |
| |
| Abstract: | It is well known that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in the standard three-candidate spatial voting model when candidates maximize their share of the vote. When all that matters to the candidates is winning the election, however, we show that PSNE do exist. We provide a complete characterization of such equilibria and then extend our results to elections with an arbitrary number of candidates. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
|
