Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity |
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Authors: | Stefan Maus Hans Peters Ton Storcken |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200, MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function for
three alternatives is manipulable. The lower bound is derived and examples of social choice functions attaining the lower
bound are given. It is conjectured that these social choice functions are in fact all minimally manipulable social choice
functions. Since some of these social choice functions are Pareto optimal, it follows that the lower bound also holds for
Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions. Some of the minimally manipulable Pareto optimal and anonymous social
choice functions can be interpreted as status quo voting. |
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Keywords: | |
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