逃税行为的经济学分析

逃税是一种普遍的社会现象,尤其在发展中国家更为严重.纳税人在进行逃税活动时,总是权衡了风险和收益的情况下,选择最优的收入申报量,而使它的预期收入最大化.当逃税被稽查的概率与被查处所受惩罚的力度之积大于和等于1时,纳税人会倾向完全纳税,相反会倾向逃税.同时,逃税人的预期收入还受到收入、税率、稽查概率和惩罚力度等参数的影响.要遏制逃税行为,应采取适当提高稽查概率,加大惩罚力度和提高收入的显性化等措施,才能使它的危害程度降到最小.

An Economic Analysis of Tax Dodging

Tax dodging is a commonplace social phenomenon, especially in developing countries. On dodging tax, taxpayers always compare their risks and gains, and then report the most favorable amount of their income, so as to maximize their expected income. Once the product of the probability of disclosure of tax dodging timing the force of punishment for tax dodging is, or bigger than, one, taxpayers tend to pay full taxes, otherwise they tend to dodge tax. Meanwhile, the expected income of tax-dodgers is influenced by their income, tax rate, the parameter of the probability of disclosure and the force of punishment, etc. To stop tax dodging, it is necessary to increase the probability of disclosure of tax dodging, intensify the force of punishment and increase the transparency of income, and so on. Only in this way can we successfully tackle the problem of tax dodging.