列维纳斯面对康德、黑格尔、海德格尔——当代哲学关于“存在论”的争论

列维纳斯是当代法国急进的“异”类哲学的精神之父,向“存在伦”提出挑战的代表性哲学家。他颠覆了传统的“存在论-知识论”,“开创”了一个“异域”,即“价值”、“伦理”和“宗教”的“领域”,强调伦理学才是形而上学。不是“存在”“包容”了“他者”,而是“他者”“包容”了“存在”,“存在”“包容不下”-“包容不了”“他者”,“他者”“不在”“存在”之内,而在“存在”之外。“他者”“大于-强于”“存在”。伦理学问题得到了哲学上大幅度的提升。他不是完全否定“存在论”,而是把“存在论-真理论”和“价值论-伦理学”的“关系”“颠倒”了过来,将“存在论-真理论”置于“价值论-伦理学”的“制约”之下。“哲学”研究、思考的“问题”,不同于一般的经验科学,它不以日常经验之物为“对象”,但绝不是没有“对象”;“哲学”的“问题”常常不能完全“概念化”为一个“论题”,但绝非毫无“主题”。“哲学”作为一门“学科”,仍以“存在”为研究“主题”,仍以“存在”为思考“对象”,只是这个“存在”作为“对象”,并非完全在“客体”意义上来理解,而仍是一个“主题-主体”,该存在不仅展示为一物,展示为一“属性”,而且展示为一种“意义”,一句话,作为哲学“主题-对象”的不是“诸存在者”,而是“时间性的-历史性的-自由的”“存在”。

Levinas faces Kant, Hegel and Heidegger——Debates of contemporary philosophy on ontology

Levinas might be the spiritual father of the radical “difference” philosophy in contemporary France, a representative philosopher who challenges ontology. He subverts the traditional “ontology-epistemology”, “creates” a “realm of difference”, the realm of “value”, “ethic” and “religion”, maintains that ethics is actually metaphysics. It is not that “Being” contains the “Other”, rather that the “Other” contains “Being.” “Being” “can not contain”—“it is not big enough to contain” the “Other”, and the “Other” is not within, but outside “being.” The “Other” is “bigger-stronger” than “Being.” In Levinas, ethical problems have been philosophically promoted greatly. He doesn't in the least deny “ontology”, but “reverses” the relation between “ontology-theory of truth” and “axiology-ethics”, making the “ontology-theory of truth” under the control of “axiology-ethics.” “The problem” of philosophical study and thinking is different from those in empirical science in general, the object of which is not the thing of daily experience, but that absolutely does not mean to say it hasn't an object. The problem of philosophy usually can not “conceptualize” into a “thema”, but this is by no means to say it has not a “subject.” As a “science”, “philosophy” still makes “Being” its “subject” of study and its “object” of thinking, while this “Being” as the “object” is not to be understood completely in the exact “objective” sense, but remains as a “subject”, which presents not only as a thing, an “attribute”, but as a “meaning.” In a word, the “subject-object” of philosophy is not “beings”, but a “temporal historical free” “Being.”